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References 251. INTRODUCTION
Sustainability has become a term which seems to unify the many different realms of
economic policy, from growth to economic development, and from environmental issues to
intergenerational concerns. Among the reasons for the success of the term and the idea behind
it are most likely its scintillating image between a vague definition and an emotionally prepared
public, but also the hope and the need to pay tribute to the fact that most of todays economic
problems should be addressed in such a way as to take account of the increasing knowledge
about the complexity and sensitivity of the man-nature relationship. Unfortunately, this holistic
approach to economic policy is often carried more by desire than by substantial content.
Numerous definitions of sustainability have been proposed of which an extended sample is
given in Pezzey (1989). The most prominent definition was given by the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED) in the so called Brundlandt-Report : "Sustainable
development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987, p43). On the basis of this
general rule a number of more workable and quantifiable rules for sustainable resource use
have been proposed, e.g. strong sustainability and weak sustainability (see e.g.
Pearce/Atkinson 1992). In addition, attempts to empirically determine whether an economy
allocates its resources in a sustainable way have been made (ibd.).
Once one turns to operationalizing the concept of sustainable resource use, numerous
problems crop up. How should a resource be defined, what about the substitutability between
different resources, how would one define the long-run regeneration capacity, what about non-
renewable resources, etc. ? On a more methodological level, the question has been raised as to
how sustainable resource use relates to measures of welfare or whether it is itself a welfare
measure. And finally, the intertemporal character of all problems of resource use together with
the long time horizons for some of the much discussed problems such as climate change has
again revived the interest in questions of intergenerational distribution (Solow 1974, Rawls
1970, Pezzey 1990).
An analysis of the intergenerational aspects of sustainable development or growth has the
fortune to be able to draw on an extensive body of research from rather divergent fields. The
analysis of resource extraction decisions dating back to Hotelling (1931) helps to understand
the basic principles governing a rational intertemporal decision about resource extraction within
a market system. Growth theory helps to understand the conditions for achieving a long-run
steady state. Finally, the development of overlapping-generation models has provided tools for
explicitly investigating the intergenerational aspects of long-run decisions on resource use,
production and consumption decisions, and on intergenerational transfers.Intertemporal aspects of resource allocation have long been studied. The early study of the
optimal intertemporal use of exhaustible resources in a partial equilibrium framework by
Hotelling has been refined by the work on growth models with exhaustible resources by
Dasgupta/Heal (1974), Solow (1974), and Stiglitz (1974a, 1974b) in a general equilibrium
framework. These authors have been focussing on planning models of optimal resource
depletion without explicit reference to any sustainability criteria or to interemporal distribution,
resp. intergenerational transfer problems. More than ten years later this debate has again been
taken up by Solow (1986) who has concentrated on the intergenerational aspects of resource
allocation but without explicit modeling of the relationship between the subsequent generations.
He therefore concluded that the intergenerational allocation of natural resources "would seem tc
be the natural habitat of an overlapping-generations model but, as far as I know, it has not been
tried" (Solow 1986).
By now a number of overlapping-generations models have been formulated for this purpose
(Howarth 1990 and 1991, Howarth/Norgaard 1993, Maler 1993, Norgaard 1992). The model by
Maler characterizes the intertemporal conditions for an efficient resource extraction which turns
out to be the Hotelling rule in the case of a nonrenewable resource and a modified version
thereof for renewable resources. The intertemporal consumption decision in each generation is
determined by the rate of time preference. The models by Howarth and Norgaard show that for
any system of intergenerational transfers an efficient resource allocation exists. Hence, if one
wishes to achieve a specific intergenerational distribution only the appropriate system of
intergenerational transfers needs to become implemented. Similarly, a sustainable path of
intertemporal resource use and capital accumulation could also be achieved through a
corresponding transfer of resources between the generations.
This issue is taken up again in this paper. In a simple overlapping generations model with a
nonrenewable resource, the constraints on the intergenerational transfers are investigated.
Section 2 shows the basic approach. It is followed by an analysis of different taxes to achieve
the feasibility of intergenerational transfers and the sustainability of the economy. The paper
concludes with a numerical example which highlights some of the quite complex interactions
among consumption within and betwenn generations, production and investment.2. SOME SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS
In order to avoid several rather complex and well-known problems of growth theory, a
number of simplifying assumptions need to be made. One particular model is that of Hartwick
who shows that in a growth model with a nonrenewable resource, constant population, no
technical progress, and a number of other assumptions a constant consumption can be
maintained over time if the competitive rents from the resource are invested in each period. The
so called Hartwick-Rule is therefore very close to some of the more informal definitions of
sustainability. However, the Hartwick-Rule breaks down in cases of rising population or
technical progress.
The assumption of constant population is retained in this model. This admittedly is far away
from many important issues of the sustainability debate especially in the developing countries
and also misses the important and even more complicated issues of an endogenous population
growth (see Dasgupta 1993). Unfortunately with population growth the model would become
untractable.
Natural resources take on many different forms which should be adequately dealt with in a
growth model. Some resources are renewable because they can regenerate themselves, others
are nonrenewable, i.e. any amount converted in the production process is irreversibly lost for
future use. There are also resources which are not extracted but which provide as a service
their cleaning capacity for emissions. Each of these resources should be modelled differently.
Yet, since the worst scenario is naturally the case of a nonrenewable resource this paper deals
only with such a resource. Obviously, this means that a model with renewable resources or the
regenerative capacity of the environment would face fewer restrictions.
Focussing on a nonrenewable resource poses an additional problem; in the long-run the use
of the resource needs to go to zero. A steady state can be constructed only under rather severe
restrictions on technology, or - in other words - if the resource is not essential. This contradicts
the Law of Thermodynamics which does not allow positive production with a materials flow
going to zero. The model below will therefore not become subject to a steady state analysis.
Instead, the focus will be on the comparative statics before the depletion of the resource. The
rationale for this approach is that in the long-run either some unknown back-stop technology will
emerge, or that substitution with renewable resources will take place because of the change in
relative prices between renewable and nonrenewable resources. Both approaches would
impose additional complexity to the model.
A particular problem of intertemporal decision problems consists of the assumptions about
the behaviour of agents with respect to future prices of goods and resources. Both perfect
foresight and myopic behaviour are about equally unrealistic. Howarth (1990) has explicitly
modelled uncertainty about future prices and technology, but in a framework differing from themodel below with respect to the capital accumulation. Stiglitz (1974b) has shown that not only
perfect foresight but also an infinite sequence of futures markets is necessary in order to secure
intertemporal efficiency of a competitive equilibrium.
For the purpose of this model a type of "quasi-myopic" behaviour is assumed. The reason is
the following. Each generation needs to buy the resource and capital stock from the previous
generation such that the old generation can finance her consumption out of these proceeds.
The value of the two stocks, however, is the discounted sum of future income which can be
derived from using these stocks. Hence, the value of the capital stock depends on the rental
rate on capital in all future generations, and the value of the resource stock depends on all
future resource prices. Since this long-run information is unlikely to be available to the economic
agents it is assumed that they value the stock at current interest rates and resource prices. For
the short-run predictions of each generation when young about the prices when they are old it is
assumed that perfect foresight prevails.
1
Intertemporal decisions are driven by discount rates. Three different types need to be
distinguished. The marginal productivity of capital is equivalent to the interest rate and
determines the investment decisions. The pure rate of time preference represents the valuation
of each generation between consuming when young and consuming when old. The third
discount rate is that in an intergenerational welfare function representing the discounting of
utilities of different generations. Only the first two are subject of the analysis since
intergenerational welfare functions are not used in this paper, i.e., welfare statements .about
different intergenerational distributions are not attempted in this paper.
It is clear that large intergenerational transfers take place, partly forced through governments
but also voluntarily. There have been quite a number of attempts to empirically estimate the size
of intergenerational transfers and bequests. The rule of thumb given by Kotlikoff (Kottlikoff 1988
and Kotlikoff, Summers 1981) is that of the total wealth of a person about 80 percent is inherited
and 20 percent is own accumulated life-cycle wealth, i.e. own savings.
2 Yet these computations
concern only privately held wealth. Hence, they typically do not include welath in terms of
natural resources since this wealth usually is not privately held. It is either explicitly or implicitly
owned by the government.
3 If government wealth in natural resources is added, the likely wealth
transfer to the next generations is significantly higher than the estimated private wealth transfer
1 In fact, numerical simulations show that it makes little difference whether one also assumes myopic
behaviour in the short-run as well as in the long-run.
2 This has been questioned by Modigliani (1988) who claims that the figure should be substantially lower.
But see the reply in Kottlikoff (1988).
3 An example is Norway where approximately 80 percent of the petroleum wealth is owned directly or
indirectly through petroleum taxes (Steigum, Thogersen).of 80 percent mentioned above. This voluntary transfer of wealth from one generation to the
next is also excluded from this paper and left for further research.
3. A SIMPLE MODEL OF EGOISTIC INDIVIDUALS
In this first step, a very simple model is developed without consideration of many obvious and
more realistic specifications. In particular, the capital accumulation is modelled without
depreciation of the capital stock. The natural resource is a nonrenewable resource, i.e. there is
no regeneration of the resource at all. And finally, there are no transfers between generations
except market interaction, i.e. stocks can only be sold to the next generation.
The most elementary model consists of one individual in each generation t with utility
depending only on consumption when young and when old. There is also no interdependence
between levels of consumption in the two periods. Such a separable utility function can be
specified as
£& VteT (1)
where Cjt and coj denote consumption of generation t when young and when old; O denotes the
time preference factor.
The young from each generation must buy the resource stock and the capital stock from the
previous generation. The young earn resource rents from selling the resource, interest from
their capital and wage income from selling their labour L=1. The old earn rents from selling their
whole capital and resource stock.
The value of the capital stock is equal to the present value of future rents, i.e.
Value of «, =
Since r't is unknown for future periods one needs to make explicit in which way agents predict
future interest rates. A simple variant is myopic behaviour in which the current interest rate r^ is
used for all future periods. This will in the context of this model overestimate interest rates
because the increasing capital stock and the declining rate of resource extraction will lead to a
fall in the marginal product of capital and thus to lower interest rates. In a perfect foresight
framework the interest rate becomes completely endogenous over time such that it can be
solved only recursively.For simplicity I start with myopic behaviour, i.e. r^ is exogenous. Then the present value of
the capital stock is determined by
Present value of K, = r.K,Y
= (1 + rt)K,
Note that r^Kj is constant over time if the capital stock does not depreciate; also note that the
interest paid on capital in period t is counted, i.e. it is assumed that it is still appropriated by the
young generation buying that stock.
Under competitive behaviour the market prices can be used as the relevant decision
parameters of the economic agents. The budget constraint of the young then becomes




where w is the wage rate, p is the resource price, R the resource used in production, K the
capital stock, I the investment, and S the resource stock which is available in period t. The value
of the capital stock is the present value of all future rents discounted at the interest rate ^ .
The old generation does not earn labour income but finances her consumption through the
dividends of the use of the capital stock when they were young and through the sale of the
resource and capital stock to the next generation. The budget constraint of the old becomes
(1 + rtt,)(KM) + pMSI+1 = cot VteT (3)
Since Kt+-|=Kt+lt and S(+-|=Sj-Rt, and since the prices in period t+1 are unknown when the
young are optimizing, equation (3) can be written as
(1 + rt
et,)(Kt+lt) + p?tt(Sl-Rt) = cot VtET (4)
where the superscript e denotes expected values.
The production is competitively organized with a linear homogeneous production function
using one unit of labour, natural resources Rj, and capital K( in each period t. The first order




w,=f-fRRt-fK|K, VteT (7)Utility maximization of the young generation at time t then yields the first order conditions (8)
and (9) which determine an equilibirum for generation t when they are combined with equations
(5) to (7) for production efficiency and (2) as well as (3) for the budget constraints.
c^-(1+r,:,)*<4-
1 = 0 VteT (8)
P«<t
1-p?+M-
1 = 0 VteT (9)
The first order conditions then yield the classical intertemporal optimality conditions, namely





Also the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption when old and when young depends on
the ratio of the interest rate and the rate of time preference
3ct _ (<<*_] _ 1+rtt1 vt6T
It is clear then that the consumption when young and when old is equally divided if the
interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference. If the marginal productivity of capital falls
below the rate of time preference then the consumption of the old falls below that of the young
in each generation generation and vice versa.
These first order intertemporal conditions have so far neglected the constraint that the
budget constraint is actually met. Each generation is required to buy the capital stock and the
natural resource stock at the going price and needs to consume a nonnegative proportion of
output. It can then choose the amount of natural resource extracted and sold to the firms and
the investment. In order to illustrate the impact of the nonnegativity constraint, the feasible
combinations of Investment decision and resource extraction are shown in Figure 1. The curve
^min'max denotes all resource extraction and investment combinations at which the
consumption of the young generation is just zero; hence only the gray shaded area represents
a feasible consumption plan. Rmjn is the minimum resource extraction necessary to just finance
the capital and resource purchase from the last generation, i.e.
Rlmin={R,| cf=0 and I, = 0 }
(12)
] }Figure 1 Feasible Resource Extraction - Investment Decisions
The impact of (12) can be illustrated by a numerical example. Suppose, the production
function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e.
f(K,,R,,L) = K°Rt' witha + p<1
then Rmjn is given as the solution to
(13)
(14)
For a solution to exist, the share of the natural resource stock which needs to be extracted -
Rt/Sf - must be larger than p7(1-a). For plausible parameter values of a=0.3 and p=0.2, in each
period almost 30% of the stock need to be extracted just to finance the capital and resource
purchases from the previous generation.
In each generation the extraction of the resource R{ will then shift the stock Sf to the left while
Rm|n will shift to the right such that the shaded area in figure will shrink from both sides. Also
the maximum investment which is feasible given the endowment with the resource S{ is falling
with positive extraction Rf. The intergenerational trade of stocks thus imposes already a tight
restriction on the budget constraint. It should be emphasized, however, that altruistic behaviour
or forced transfers through the government could alleviate this restriction. The latter will be
discussed below.
Introducing the additional restriction of a sustainable resource stock is closely related to the
intertemporal aspects of the budget constraint of the young in each generation which has been
just discussed. Sustainability requires investment in man-made capital in order to substitute for
the extraction and diminuation of the resource stock. The question then is how the set offeasible allocations is bounded if the extraction-investment decision is made in such a way that
it can be considered sustainable. Among the many definitions of sustainability one is chosen
which seems plausible in the context of this model and which fits its logic.
One of most often cited rules demands that the stock of resources - natural, human, and
man-made resources - should be non-decreasing. Of course, such a requirement can only be
made operational if some way of aggregating natural resources, man-made capital and human
capital is defined. The most natural approach amounts to taking the value of the resources to be
non-decreasing, hence the sum of the values of the different stocks which is transferred from
one generation to the other should not be falling. This might at first look like an innocuous rule,
yet it is not if one recognizes that the prices of the resources themselves are endogenous in this
model. Hence investment and extraction decisions not only change the stocks of the different
resources, they also change their prices in rather complex ways.
If the sustainability rule requires the overall available resource stock - i.e. the sum of the
values of the man-made and natural capital or resources
4 - not to decrease in value over time
this can be interpreted as the requirement that the increase in the value of the capital stock
should at least be equal to the fall in the value of the resource stock, i.e.
(1 + r,+,)K,+1 - (1 + r,)K, + Pt+A+, -P,S, 2 0 (15)
Under specific assumptions condition (15) amounts to the requirement that the present value of
the investment should at least be equal to the value of the natural resources extracted. Hence
(1 + r,)ltSrtR, VteT (16)
The main assumption for (16) to be equivalent to (15) is constant prices. Hence (16) is implicitly
a myopic criterion which under- or overestimates the necessary investment, since the present
value of the investment in period t PV(I{) is
5
This is only equal to l{ if the interest rate is constant over time and if there is no deprectiation of
the capital stock. Normally, the interest rate will be falling over time since an ever larger capital
stock is combined with a decreasing input of the natural resource. The same argument holds for
the resource price, i.e. the scarcity value of the stock, is not constant either, but increasing such
4 Human capital is not part of this model; hence it is ignored in the following.
5
; Also assuming that the investment only pays dividend in the next period.
10that one might be inclined not to use the current scarcity price but a appropriately weighted sum
of future scarcity prices.
This particular sustainability constraint can be combined with the feasible 'investment-
extraction schedule above. Equation (16) is nonlinear in Rj because the resource price depends
among other things on the extraction itself. Equation (16) is shown in Figure 2. All combinations
of I and R above the line OM are sustainable under this myopic rule. It is evident that this rule is
grossly wrong near the maximum extraction Sj, since in the following period output would fall to
zero if the resource is essential. This deficiency comes from the static character of the rule
which does not take into account future effects as it has been mentioned above.
Figure 2 . Feasible and Sustainable Allocation
The shaded area between the zero consumption schedule and the sustainability schedule
then would allow positive consumption paired with a sustainable investment plan. Since the
shaded area can not be determined explicitly, some indirect charactistics can be deducted. First
of all, for the set of feasible and sustainable allocations to be nonempty the intersection of the




e following inequality must hold:
t,S,)-[i + f(K1,St)]Kt-ffl(Kt,S1)S,>^(Kt,St)St
(1.8)
If a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, the restriction amounts to the following.
Let a and p be the factor shares of capital and the natural resource, then a necessary condition




11i.e., the factor share of p must be sufficiently small for the denominator on the right-hand side to




Hence, the rate of return on capital should be larger than the parameters on the right hand side.
For reasonable values of o=0.3 and p=0.2 this amounts to the restriction that rj>1 where rj
measures the rate of return over one generation. Still, even when measured in generations this
requires extremely high interest rates.
The minimum extraction of the natural resource necessary to meet the sustainability
constraint and at the same time achieve a non-negative consumption is given by the
intersection of the maximum investment line and the sustainability curve. The corresponding Rs
is given as the solution to the implicit function (19) for any given Kf and S(.
f(K,,Rt)-[i + f(K,,Rt)]Kt-ffl(Kt,Rt)(St+Rt) = O (21)
A characterisation of the likely size of the minimum R can be given for a Cobb-Douglas
production function. Then equation (24) reduces to the condition




For cc=0.3 and 0=0.2 - as in the previous example - more than 40% of the resource stock in any
period must be extracted.
Capital Depreciation
The achievement of a sustainable investment and resource extraction schedule becomes
more difficult if the capital stock depreciates. The investment necessary to keep the capital
stock constant needs to be added to the investment offsetting the resource extraction in value
terms. The set of feasible sustainable allocations in figure 2 will therefore shrink. Whereas the
budget constraint of the young generation which is represented by the curve Rmin'max
 ls
 no'
affected by the introduction of a depreciating capital stock, the sustainability frontier given by
the curve OM will shift upwards.
12BFbMofrhefc
Jes Instihjts fur Welfwirfscho?-
If capital deprecitates with a rate of 5, then the existing capital stock will shrink over time and
the present value of capital, again under the assumption of myopic behaviour for the interest
rate and, becomes





The sustainability restriction given in equation (15) and (16) then becomes
-JL_(1 + rt)(l,-5Kt)2:p,Rt VtsT (25) r, + o,
i.e. the investment necessary to balance the use of resources needs to be higher in order to
compensate for the depreciation of the capital stock.
The effect of capital depreciation on the budget constraint is far from clear because several
effects interact. First of ail, depreciation lowers the present value of the capital stock (see
equation 25) thus requiring less resource extraction in order to finance the purchase of this
stock. At the same time, less resource extraction lowers the wage rate and consequently the
income and it also lowers the marginal product of capital thus reducing the value of the capital
stock even further. But it raises the marginal product of the resource, hence it increases the
value of the resource stock which also needs to be bought by the young generation. It is
therefore not at all obvious whether a depreciating and thus less valuable capital stocks
requires less resources for the intergenerational trade of stocks. The sign of the derivative of
Fit.min with respect to 6 is therefore not uniquely deteremined (see equation 26).
/ I l
R,m,v,=lR, I c,=0 and I, = 0 f
(26)
where f< =UKt,RtJI,J and fe =fH(K,,Rtmin)
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of a depreciating capital stock on the set of feasible and
sustainable allocations. The dotted lines represent the situation without depreciation of the
capital stock as shown in Figure 2. The original sustainability constraint OM is shifted upward to
6KM'. The constraint for the feasible investment funds is shifted at Rt=Sj from lmax *
0 ''max-
The intersection Rmjn may shift to the left as long as the function itself has a positive slope.
6
The intuition for a positive slope is that the direct effect of an increase in the resource use on
6 This follows directly from differentiating equation (26)..
13output is larger than its effect on the value of the capital and resource stock. The corresponding
set of feasible and sustainable allocations is given by the area DrmaxM'. The intersection of the
two curves may be to the right or the left of the original Rs-














The intersection of the two lines indicating the minimum resource use which assures both
meeting the budget constraint and the sustainability rule, i.e. Rs and D depends on the capital
stock and the rate of depreciation. For reasonable values of the rate of return on capital and on
the rate of depreciation the minimum resource use increases with larger rates of depreciation.
One can also determine for a Cobb-Douglas technology the necessary conditions for the
existence of a feasible and sustainable allocation, i.e. l'max > M'. Equation (20) then becomes
rt(r,+5)>_cL_ = 1 (27) r,+6
2 1-a-2p
for a = 0.3 and p = 0.2
Again this condition is not met for reasonable paramter values of the production function as
well as interest rates and rates of depreciation. Indeed, the example in equation (27) requires rf
to be larger than 17
7 Solving equation (27) yields rt
2 + rt(8-1)-5
2>0 which has a solution only rt > 1 for all 0 > 0 < 1.
Otherwise rt needs to be at least larger than 0,8.
144. TAXATION
One can identify at least two objectives for government intervention: It can induce
intergenerational transfers in order to alleviate the burden which the intergenerational trades of
resource and capital stocks imposes upon the young generation; and it can distort the relative
prices, e.g., in order to change the price path of the exhaustible resource or the capital
accumulation. Both serve distinct purposes and should therefore by treated separately.
Nevertheless, the intergenerational transfers imposed through appropriate taxes may also
change the path of resource extraction and or capital accumulation in addition to the likely
change in the intertemporal consumption decision. On the other hand, imposed changes in the
relative resource prices may also affect the distribution between the young and the old in each
generation.
There are many different ways of taxing the young or the old and there are different ways of
using the tax revenues. Tax revenues could be used for intergenerational transfers, e.g.
redistributing tax revenues from the old of one generation to the young in the next generation,
or for directly influencing the growth path, e.g. through state investment in addition to the private
investment. Both the tax base and the recycling of the revenues determine the dynamic
equilibrium conditions. First, a kind of property tax on the old generation is introduced in which
the total wealth of the old which they sell to the young in order to finance their consumption is
taxed. The revenues are given to the young generation. The second alternative consists of a
resource tax, i.e. the young generation pays a tax on resource extraction the revenues of which
are invested in the capital stock by the government.
Property Tax
Suppose the government wishes to force an intergenerational transfer in order to lower the
burden of the young generation consisting In the need to purchase the resource and capital
stock from the old. In this way, the government forces intergenerational transfers upon the
generations which they would not voluntarily undertake in this model. The most obvious way to
achieve this goal is by levying a kind of property tax upon the old, i.e. by taxing the value of the
stocks they own. The pre-tax value of the resource stock of generation t-1 in period t, i.e. when
it is old, is p,St and that of the capital stock is given by the discounted rents from that stock
provided the marginal productivity of the capital stock does not change over time.
8 The tax
revenue of taxing generation t-1 will then amount to
8 This Is, of course, wrong, but would again reflect the assumption that the agents value the stocks
myopically.
15with T° representing the tax rate. This revenue is redistributed to the young of generation t such
that their budget constraint becomes
(1 + rl)Kt + lt + p,St (29)
with the left-hand side representing income and the right-hand side representing expenditure of
the young. After rearranging terms in (29) and using the first-order conditions for an efficient
production decision one obtains
l (30)
The area of feasible and sustainable consumption plans in Figure 2 then increases. This can be
represented by the point R§ (Figure 2) which is now defined by the implicit function
(31)
Similar to the introduction of a depreciating capital stock one can derive the impact of a property
tax oti'the conditions for a sustainable and feasible allocation, it is clear that the sustainability
constraint (equation 25) is independent of the tax rate, hence the corresponding curve is




Let the derivative of (29) with respect to R^ i.e. the slope of the budget constraint be denoted by
IR, then
^(1^)^RKt + ^RRt+fflR(StR,) + ^^fKRKt| (33)
where fjj represents the second and cross derivatives of the production function. The sign of Ip
is indeterminate. The sum of the first two terms in the bracket is negative by the assumption of
homogeneity of degree one of the production function, the third term is also negative because
of the concavity of the production function. The last term is positive such that its size relative to
the first three terms determines whether IR has a positive slope. This last term represents the
16already mentioned effect of an increase in the resource use on the value of the capital stock. As
long as the stock effect is smaller than the flow effect on production IR has a positive slope.
For a Cobb-Douglas production function this reduces to
0 (34)
For reasonable parameter values of the production function and for a sufficiently large resource
stock relative the resource extraction equation (34) has a positive sign.
9
An increase or the introduction of the property tax will then shift the budget constraint to the left
if the budget constraint itself has a positive slope, i.e. IR>0. This is surely the case for low rates
of depreciation and it is also the more likely the higher the tax rate. Hence, the set of feasible
and sustainable allocations increases through the introduction of a tax on the wealth of the old
generation. Therefore, it becomes more likely that an intergenerational equilibrium exists which
is also sustainable.
The overall effect on the utility maximizing decision of consumers changes the first order
conditions for the intertemporal price path of interest rates and resource prices - the Hotelling
rule - from euqation (10) to




and the intertemporal consumption choice (equation 11) to
vteT (36)
The conditions show that the time path of resource prices is not affected by the tax. Only the
rate of depreciation enters the adjusted Hotelling rule (35). However, the intertemporal
consumption decision changes because the respective incomes of the young and the old
become redistributed. The effects of such a forced transfer of wealth from the old to the young
generation on the levels of investment and consumption can not be shown analytically. Some
numerical examples are given in the last section.
9 The term (1 - 8)8 / (^ + 8)
2 has an inversely u-shaped graph, i.e. it is small for 6 near 0 and near 1.
17Resource Tax
The property tax does not change the price path of the resource and capital prices since it
only changes the income levels within each generation and thus forces a reallocation of
consumption and investment. Therefore, if one wishes to change the resource price itself, a tax
on resource extraction is the appropriate approach. It is assumed that the tax revenues are
invested by the government thus increasing the capital stock. At the same time, the consumers
do take that public investment into consideration when they make their own investment decision
because the capital stock in the next period - when they are old - contains their own as well as
the public investment. Consequently there is considerable crowding out of private investment.
An alternative assumption would be to let agents take the investment decision under a myopic
behaviour, i.e. the expected capital stock is determined only by the private investment.
Since the resource extraction tax lowers the income of the young generation it is necessary
to both tax the property of the old and the resource extraction of the young in order to
compensate the young for their loss in resource rents. Otherwise the problems of violating the
budget constraint of the young generation which have been discussed within the basic model










which reduces to the orginal Hotelling rule if x
R=0 and 6=0.
Equation (37) is derived under the assumption that the young generation knows about the
public investment through the tax revenues of the resource tax. Under myopic behaviour, the
second term in the nominator of the left-hand side of equation (37) disappears. Rearranging
terms in (37) then shows that the resource price path is not influenced under the full information
assumption because equation (37) reduces to (35), i.e.
?r( U VtsT (38)
Pt
 rt+i+°
With myopic behaviour, however, (37) becomes
_! vteT (39)
i.e. the growth rate of the resource price has fallen. This corresponds to a lower resource
extraction in the first generations compared to the full information situation. However, since the
resource price increases faster under full information the myopic resource extraction will
eventually rise above the one with full information. Consequently, the resource extraction tax
18does reduce resource use in the first few generations but it will not reduce the long-run resource
use because of the flatter price path of resources.
1
0
These effects do not take into account the repercussions from the investment and consumption
decisions. Such second round general equilibrium effects will also change the path of resource
use even in the case of full information when public investment is crowding out private
investment.
5. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
The model is set up in a way which does not allow a steady state to be reached. The reason
being that an exhaustible resource is part of the model and that there is no technical progress
counteracting the resource depletion through appropriate increases in productivity. The
complete model therefore develops over time outside a steady state. In order to illustrate these
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The model assumes - as it has been done in the previous numerical examples - a Cobb-
Douglas production function in three inputs where the labour input is normalized to one. The
1
0 These effects are illustrated in the Figures 5 and X in the next section.
19parameters of the production function Q = AK°R
P are A=50, a=0.3, and p=0.2. The utility function
is given in equation (1) with £=0.1 and a rate of pure rate of time preference of 0.3, i.e. <E>~.77.
The rate of depreciation over one generation is 6=0.3. The initial capital stock is taken to be
K-(=150 and the resource stock S-(=500. The overlapping generations model is run over 6
generations. It turns out - as one could expect from the discussion above - that the budget
constraint is violated without a sufficiently high tax rate. Therefore, the simulations are run for
tax rates on the value of the capital and resource stock of the old generation between 75% and
95%.
Figure 4 illustrates the different resource stocks when the tax on the property of the old
generation is increased from 75% to 95%.
1
1 An increasing tax rate eases the pressure on the
budget constraint for the young generation because the purchase of the capital and resource
stock which it needs to buy is financed through the redistributed tax revenues. This leaves more
room for consumption and investment, hence it results in a higher capital stock. Figure 4 also
shows that under very high tax rates, e.g. x°=0.95, the capital accumulation collapses. This is
probably so because the desired division between consumption when young and when old
within each generation - specifically a sufficiently high consumption of the old - can not be
maintained unless the consumption of the young also increases thus leaving no room for
investment which incidently also does not yield a high return net of taxes.
Sustanability (Alternate RopertyTa<es, Rrst&nerdionSsttoiOCi)
_B_to=0.75 _t_ to =0.80 _4_to = 0.85
_o_ to = 0.90 <, to = 0.95 ;. to = 0.90 full information
Numbers below 100 indicate improvements in sustainability. Sustainability is reached at zero!
Figure 5
The tax on resource extraction is set to 20%.
20The intergenerational transfers, however, have almost no impact on sustainability measured
as the total value of the capital and resource stock. The investment is not large enough to
balance the reduction in the resource stock; the total value falls by more than one half over five
generations (Figure 5). Only under the tax rate of 95% the fall is slighty over one half. The
intergenerational transfer forced through the property tax on the old generation does only
lessen the budgetary pressure of intergenerational purchases but it does not significantly
improve the sustainability of the economy. Several effects contribute to this. First of all, the
intergenerational transfer does not directly increase the resource price trajectory thus it does not
force resource conservation. Secondly, the rate of return on investment is not affected through
the tax such that no incentive for higher investment is created. Finally, the taxation of the capital
stock is equivalent to a reduction in the return on investment, i.e. the after tax rate of return falls
the higher the tax rate becomes.
The effect of a tax on the extraction of the resource is illustrated in the following figures.
Figure 6 shows the amount of resource extracted by each generation for different levels of the
resource tax tr. As it has been already discussed in connection with the Hotelling rule [equations
(38) and (39)] the tax lowers the amount of resource extracted in the first two generations. But
since the growth rate of the resource price is lower the higher the tax rate, this resuits is
reversed for the following generations where higher taxes leed to higher resource extraction.
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Figure 6
It is assumed that the tax revenues of the resource tax are invested in the capital stock. It
has been shown in equation (38) that the resource price path does not change if the young
21generation takes these public investments into account when choosing their own private
investment, i.e. there is complete crowding out of private investment, at least as long as the
budget constraint does not reduce the desired investment. In Figure 6 the resource
extraction schedule under full information is also shown. It reflects the steeper extraction
path which is induced by the higher growth rate of the resource price, and it also shows
that, compared to the myopic case, more of the resource is extracted in the first two
generations and less by the later generations.
Resource Price
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Figure 7
The resource extraction path mirrors the resource price path which is shown in Figure 7. The
resource prices start at an approximately equal level in the first generation. This results in larger
differences in factor demand because of the demand elasticity of 1.25 implied by the parameter
choice of the production function. Later on the prices diverge significantly but do not induce a
comparable divergence in resource demand the reason being different capital stocks which
influence the marginal productivity of the resource. Higher resource taxes therefore raise the
level of resource prices, but they do not raise the rate at which resources prices rise.
To the contrary, Figure 8 shows that the interest rate falls. This means that not only the tax does
lower the rate of growth of the resource price but the interest rates is also falling. However, the
interest rate falls slower under high resource taxes, hence in the high tax case the tax rate
effect is dominating. This can also be seen by inspection of the adjusted Hotelling rule in
equation (39).
22Interest Rate and Resource Price
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Figure 9
Finally, Figure 9 summarizes the effect of alternative resource taxes on the total value of the
resource and capital stock, i.e. on our chosen measure of sustainability. Given myopic
expectations of the agents, higher resource taxes indeed move the economy nearer towards
sustainability - which would be reached if the index goes to zero - if the resource tax is high
enough. Ironically, the index of sustainbility starts to fall sharply as soon as the resource stock
23begins to get near extinction and the resource prices rise fast. This index of sustainabiiity
therefore picks up more the increase in the value of the resource stock than the reduction in its
size.
SUMMARY
This paper has illustrated the intergenerationai issues that arise in a world with nonrenewable
resources wihtin an overlapping generations model. Under the assumption of individuals without
altruism towards future generations, the necessary resource transfers would very quickly violate
the budget constraint of future generations if sustainabiiity were to be achieved. The only way
out is to extract the nonrenwable resource very quickly or to force the intergenerationai transfer
outside the market.
If the capital and resource stock owned by the old generation is transferred by the
government to the young generation through a property tax whose receipts are given to the
young, the pressure on the budget constraint of the young generation is reduced.
Consequently, the resource extraction necessary to finance the intergenerationai trade can be
reduced. However, the numerical example shows that this is by far not enough to achieve a
sustainable resource use where the value of the resource extraction matches the net
Investment in the capital stock. This tax also has no influence on the growth rate of the resource
price, i.e. the Hotelling rule. It therefore does not lead to resource conservation per se.
The introduction of a tax on resource extraction is another possibility to influence the
resource extraction, consumption and investment decision of the economic agents. Here it is
assumed that the revenues of this tax are invested in the capital stock. If the economic agents
take that investment into account there is complete crowdung out of private investment through
public investment. Under myopic behaviour such a tax would move the economy towards
sustainabiiity but would never reach it. The reason is that the tax can not be raised without
bounds because this tax also reduces the income of the young generation such that their
budget constraint becomes violated if the tax rate is too high. The resource tax raises the price
of the resource but has also the effect of lowering the rate of growth of the resource price.
Hence, it helps in the short run but can hurt in the long run. The numerical example shows that
higher resource taxes indeed increase sustainabiiity, but this is mainly due to the increase in the
price of the resource and not due to the lower resource extraction or increased investment.
This model has illustrated that sustainabiiity is very difficult to achieve within an
intergenerationai framework with non-altruistic individuals. But this is an unrealistic assumption
as empirical research shows that intergenerationai altruism and bequests contribute to a large
24extent to the the intergenerational transfers. It would be interesting to follow up this research by
explicitly taking into account the bequest motive of individuals.
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